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ABSTRACT 
 
Reforms and Productivity Dynamics in Chinese  
State-Owned Enterprises∗ 
 
Institutional change has taken place gradually since 1978 for State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) in the Industrial Sector of China. In this paper we estimate the effect of deep reform 
(the right to hire and fire labour, buy and sell capital and operate on international markets) on 
the productivity dynamics of enterprises. Using a unique balanced panel of 681 SOEs for the 
period 1980 to 1994, we find consistent production function estimates using an algorithm put 
forward in Olley and Pakes (1996), which corrects for simultaneity bias. Furthermore, we 
allow selection to reform to be endogenous, and correct for this selection bias by formulating 
an entry rule to reform similar to the Olley and Pakes (1996) exit rule. We show that exposure 
to deep reform have lead to higher productivity realisations while remaining under state 
ownership.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The focus of this paper is to estimate the parameters of a production function for Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the Industrial sector of the economy during the period 
1980 to 1994. We use such estimates to examine changes in the distribution of enterprise 
level productivity, paying particular attention to a set of deep enterprise level reforms. 
Deep reforms reflect the right to hire and fire labour, buy and sell capital assets and 
operate on international markets. We intend to show that such deep reforms have induced 
large improvements in productivity at the enterprise level, controlling for simultaneity 
and selection bias. Simultaneity bias can result from a tendency for high productivity 
enterprises to hire more labour and invest more into capital.  Selection bias results from 
the fact that unobservable productivity can make enterprises more likely to reform.  
 Our analysis is carried out on unique data, derived from surveys undertaken by 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and academics from Oxford University 
and the University of Michigan. These surveys were undertaken in two waves covering 
the periods 1980-89 (769 enterprises) and 1990-1994 (681 enterprises) and give us a 
balanced panel of 681 Chinese SOEs during the years 1980 and 1994. The data covers 
four provinces, Jilin, Jiangsu, Shanxi and Sichuan (northeast, east, north and west) of 
China. The sample covers thirty-nine industries but is clustered into homogeneous goods 
industries such as the manufacturing of machinery, textiles, chemicals and building 
materials. The surveys contain the quantitative information necessary to estimate 
production functions. In addition, the surveys contain more qualitative questions on the 
year that each enterprise adopted a particular reform. This allows us to control for a 
selection to reform bias in our estimation procedure.  Appendix I outlines the data used in 
our estimation procedure.  
Groves et al. (1994), (1995) and Li, (1997) have used the data covering the period 
1980-89 and Li and Wu (2002) for the period 1980 and 1994. These papers also use a 
production function approach to evaluate the reform process but there are three key issues 
not addressed by them that we take on in this paper. First, they correct for simultaneity 
bias in their production functions by using a naive within group estimator. This 
requires the enterprise component of productivity to be time invariant. Secondly, they do 
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not allow for selection bias coming from an endogenous reform process. The Central 
Government may have become more open to allowing enterprises to undertake reforms 
over time, but this does not imply that enterprises get selected on non-economic grounds 
or by random selection. We provide evidence (supported by the literature) that the 
decision to select into reform came from the grassroots which depended on enterprise 
level characteristics, some of which are observable to us, and others not (productivity 
type).  
Finally, we consider a set of reforms overlooked by other studies. These deep 
reforms gave enterprises the right to hire and fire labour, buy and sell capital assets and 
operate on international markets and were taken-up by enterprises from the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.1 Such reforms allowed enterprises to distance themselves from 
government in day-to-day operations while government remained the equity holder. 
There are two important observations concerning the take-up of deep reforms. The take-
up was not industry or region specific. We observe those who did, and did not, select to 
reform across all industries and regions. Secondly, once enterprises embrace one deep 
reform there is a push to select further deep reforms. This indicates that the set of deep 
reforms were considered complementary in nature. Thus, while the reform process in 
China has been gradual, it is apparent that the complementary nature of reforms was 
appreciated for these critical, deep reforms. We witness initial reforms in the 1980s, 
which increased output autonomy, the payment of wage bonuses, and devolution of 
control from the centre to the regions (municipality), and the use of market prices on the 
margin. While these reforms improved incentives, the transmission of information, and 
the internal organisation of enterprise, researchers have not been able to link productivity 
to initial reforms, see Li and Wu (2002) and Groves et al. (1994). Indeed, Coady and 
Wang (2000) provide evidence that rent sharing was driving the allocation of bonuses in 
                                                 
1 Li and Wu (2002) do consider the issue of increased competitive pressure coming from a second stage of 
reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which are related to our set of reforms.  They proxy competitive 
pressure at the enterprise level with the ratio of input to output prices and the ratio of private to state 
controlled investment. These are included as additional regression variables in the production function. The 
ratio of input to output prices (motivated as a price cost mark-up) is constructed from variables that are 
used as deflators for output and raw materials in the production function. Their proxies for competitive 
pressure seem endogenous.   
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Chinese SOEs with little efficiency gain. We set out to document productivity gains from 
a second stage of deeper reform. 
Thus, our goal is to estimate consistent production function parameters dealing 
with two interrelated estimation biases. Simultaneity bias arises out of the fact that input 
demands are, in part, determined by the managers knowledge of productivity levels. 
Selection bias stems from the notion that productivity affects the decision to select into 
deep reform. We adapt an estimation algorithm developed in Olley & Pakes (1996) to 
deal with both of these biases.   
Why use Olley & Pakes (1996) to deal with simultaneity bias? Blundell, Bond 
and Windmeijer (2000) suggest a system GMM estimator to deal with simultaneity bias 
in production functions. The problem with this approach is that there is no behavioural 
model of the unobservable. They model the unobservable as a dynamic error component 
model and use linear and non-linear moment restrictions (from the structure of the error) 
to estimate the parameters of the production function with some precision. The benefit of 
the Olley & Pakes (1996) approach is that there is a structural model of the unobservable 
that suggests the optimal investment dynamics of enterprises, given the observable state 
variables, should allow one to control effectively for the omitted unobservable using non-
parametric techniques. One key question is whether the investment dynamics present in 
Chinese State Owned Enterprises would tell us anything about enterprise level 
productivity. Clearly, we appeal to the first welfare theorem. Planners try to make 
decisions that mimic what prices do in a decentralised economy. During our sample 
period enterprises were at least signed up to a contract responsibility system. The 
contract had profit and tax targets to be paid to the government and, in return, managers 
and workers would be paid agreed bonuses. Even though incentive problems were not 
solved, clearly planners would target investment at enterprises where profit and taxes 
were coming back to government. Such investment dynamics should be enough to back 
out the unobservable (productivity type). Clearly, the adopting of our deep reforms 
should induce investment dynamics to reflect productivity type. We will allow the non-
parametric relationship between investment and the (observable and unobservable) state 
variables to be different across unreformed and reformed enterprises. In addition, ex-post, 
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we confirm that investment and productivity estimates at the enterprise level are 
positively correlated over-time in both sub-samples.  
We also use Olley & Pakes (1996) to deal with our selection to reform bias. With 
respect to the Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000) system GMM estimator, it is hard 
to see how the parametric IV approach deals with selection biases, particularly in the 
presence of endogenous dummy variables. We wish to allow selection to reform to be 
endogenous, and correct for this selection bias by formulating an entry rule to reform 
similar to the Olley and Pakes (1996) exit rule. Their 3-step semi-parametric approach 
can deal with simultaneity and selection biases in a simple way.  The main contribution 
of this paper is to adapt their estimation procedure to allow for a selection to reform bias. 
Allowing for the endogenous nature of reform/internal organisation within companies is 
absent in most literatures (mainly due to a lack of data and estimation procedures). 
Turning to our results, we first treat reform as an exogenous (rather than a choice) 
variable that is randomly allocated across enterprises. We control for a simultaneity bias 
in a two-step procedure using Olley & Pakes (1996). Our parameters move in the 
direction found in other studies when compared to OLS estimates. The labour coefficient 
decreases and our capital coefficient increases. Given that we find significant differences 
in our productivity estimates across reformed and unreformed firms we split the sample 
according to reform status and employ a three-step Olley & Pakes (1996) procedure. 
Thus, we allow the selection into the reformed or not reformed sub-samples to be 
endogenous to an enterprises productivity type, as well as production technology to differ 
across reform-type. Our results indicate that enterprises that embrace deep reform under 
Sate Ownership exhibit higher productivity compared to enterprises in the initial stages of 
reform, controlling for simultaneity and selection biases. Most western studies that have 
failed to find efficiency gains from privatisation argue that State Owned Companies tend 
to operate with competitive pressures in factor and product markets pre-privatisation and 
hence the contributions of privatisation are hard to isolate (see Walsh and Whelan, 2001, 
for an overview). This paper presents a natural experiment that supports this previously 
untested view. Exposure to competitive forces in factor and product markets does induce 
important efficiency gains at the enterprise level pre-privatisation. 
 6
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides the 
reader with the background of enterprise reform in China. We set out how we tailor the 
behavioural model of Olley and Pakes (1996) to our particular problem in section three. 
Section four summarises the estimation procedure. Our results and conclusions are set out 
in sections five and six, respectively.  
 
2. CHINESE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
 
In this section we shall elaborate on the nature of the reform process in State-Owned 
Enterprises. We highlight two main characteristics of reform. First, reforms were not 
assigned randomly, but rather due to pressure from able enterprises, which fully 
appreciated their ability to profit from implementing reforms. Furthermore, while overall 
reform process has been gradual, crucial deep reforms were clustered together.  
There exists a wide consensus that the authorities, lacking an initial clear vision of 
the reform goal, and hence could also not have planned a reform path, gave in to 
grassroots (enterprise) pressure. It appears that the grassroots appreciation of the potential 
offered by the market, beginning with the agricultural sector, caused the reform process 
to advance. In this sense initial reforms cannot be seen as the initiation of a plan, which 
was to bring to reality some grand vision. Also, the quality of their impact in isolation is 
widely disputed. Over time a clearer vision of reforms was developed, and commitment 
to reform intensified. Thus, initial reform was preparatory which allowed a second stage 
of reforms to become a possibility. Interestingly, we provide evidence that a second stage 
of deeper reform were undertaken all together by an enterprise or were not implemented 
at all. The fact that they were taken up as a package indicates that the 
authorities/enterprises realised the complementary nature of such deep reforms. Thus, it 
appears that China, accidentally or otherwise, allowed the short-term inefficiency of 
gradual reform, while at the same time building the institutions/social capital that would 
provide the infrastructure to support crucial, deep reform. In this section we support the 
above view of the reform process in more detail.   
Reform in China was initiated in 1978 due to the realisation that the economy had 
been near stagnating over the preceding decades, and a large portion of the population 
was living on less than a dollar a day. Reforms refer to institutional changes that move 
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the economy from planned to a market economy. The crucial difference is reflected in 
prices, which are set by the planner in the former, and set in the market in the latter case. 
Prices under planning are often set such that inputs are cheap and final goods are 
expensive, especially industrial goods. Thus, profits from the industrial sector are the 
main source of government revenue, rather than taxes as in market economies. Hence, the 
allocation of goods in the economy is not achieved by demand and supply creating a 
price that reflects the value/scarcity of a product. Rather, the planner must process a 
wealth of information and then use this information in order to gear the economy toward 
arriving at some set of desirable goals, defined by quotas. Information and incentive 
problems lead to stockpiling and loss of economic prowess. Over-time this system has 
had to reform. (Naughton, 1995).  
Since the act of planning is so complex, partial reform within planning may not 
improve efficiency significantly, but may, in fact, lead to distortions, which adversely 
affect efficiency and the commitment to further reform, see Dewatripont & Roland 
(1995). However, a big bang approach, that removes all aspects of planning without the 
institutions of a market economy in place, could result in a period of disorganisation, 
which could in turn result in an initial massive fall in output as witnessed in the former 
Soviet Union; see (Repkine and Walsh, 1999) and (Konings and Walsh, 1999). In 1978 
the Chinese tentatively sought for a way to avoid this problem, where the governments 
role often has been to permit change rather than to initiate it (McMillan, 1994). The 
planned economy was upheld, while units bought and sold goods in the market, at market 
prices, if they were in excess of quotas regulations. While initial reforms in industry were 
deemed unsuccessful, with some retrenchment by 1983, there was a strong push for 
reforms again after 1983 (Naughton, 1995). Thus, we witness the birth of the Dual-Track 
system, which allows both planned and market prices to coexist for goods produced to 
quotas and excess goods respectively.  
Beginning in 1978 [], China reformed its industrial sector. Enterprises that 
had been largely controlled by the state were given some market or market-like 
incentives. [] State owned enterprises were allowed to keep some fraction of their 
profits, where before all profits had to be remitted to the state. Enterprises began to sell 
some of their outputs and buy some of their inputs in free markets, rather than selling and 
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procuring everything at state-controlled prices (Groves et al., 1994; see also Byrd 1991, 
Naughton 1995, Qian, 1999). 
In 1978 SOEs accounted for 78 percent of industrial output, 19 percent of total 
employment (Kennedy & Marquis, 1988). The degree of state produced output sold at 
market prices rose steadily, and averaged 38 percent of state-owned enterprises output 
by 1989, and, in particular cases, even amounted to all output. By the same time on 
average 56 percent of inputs to state production was procured at market prices. 
(McMillan, 1994) 
By the end of the 1980s most SOEs in our sample had engaged in this type of 
reform, now having the right to determine output value, pay bonuses, retain excess 
profits, and sell and produce at market prices. Also, the level of control was devolved 
from the state or provincial level to the municipal level. We view these reforms as initial 
steps toward creating a market economy environment. The effect of these reforms by 
themselves is overviewed in Li and Wu (2002), who conclude that their effect was indeed 
limited. Groves et al. (1994) take a more benevolent view of initial reforms, but they fail 
to link the reform process to productivity. Indeed, while they provide strong evidence that 
firms make use of their right to pay bonuses out of retained profits, they fail to supply 
convincing evidence that bonuses, which, it should be stressed, were distributed evenly 
across worker-class, effected efficiency gains. We are of the persuasion that SOE workers 
were bonus-sharing, as outlined in Coady and Wang (2000). Also, the fact that the 
government passed a law in the late eighties dictating that bonuses could only increase at 
a rate commensurate with productivity gains is a strong signal that bonuses were de facto 
abused in rent-seeking behaviour.  
Thus, the main function of initial reforms appears to be the creation of institutions 
necessary for the second stage of reforms to be successful. A standstill at the level of 
initial reform was counterproductive, as certain agents made use of the status quo in this 
halfway house by trading between the co-existing parts of the economy. This reportedly 
led to a rise in social tension in the late 1980s (See Laffont & Qian, 1999; Dewatripont & 
Roland, 1995; Fang, 1994). 
It is at this point that the authorities began to appreciate the necessity to advance 
further reforms, but still they lacked a clear goal or path, which is summed up in the 
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slogan crossing the river by touching stones. [U]ncertainty over its vision of the 
future and aversion to risk help explain Chinas initial groping reform strategy. and 
success has sustained the continuity of a gradual evolutionary approach to reform  ( 
Jefferson & Singh, 1999). It was appreciated that the growth in the private sector could 
not be matched by the state-sector. One can say with respect to this phenomenon that, 
rather than destroying the old institutions and starting from scratch, China let its new 
economy grow around what already existed, i.e. was [g]rowing out of the Plan 
(Naughton, 1995). 
 Further reforms were initiated. Figure 1a shows how reforms evolved over time in 
our sample of enterprises. We see how these deep reforms begin in the late 1980s, but 
only permeate most of the sample by the early 1990s. Even though are data on reforms 
only goes to 1995, careful analysis of the data shows that an enterprise's endeavour in one 
of these areas tended to be followed by further reform in another critical area. Also, 
contrary to our prior beliefs there is no clear sequencing in the adoption of deep reform. 
Thus, these later reforms were not taken up gradually: enterprises selected to the full 
package, or did not undertake any of the second stage reforms. The evolution of the 
proportion of enterprises taking up a set of deep reforms is illustrated in Figure 1b. 
  Regarding the causality of reforms, which is an important part of our analysis, we 
find support for our view that it runs from enterprise performance to reform and vice-
versa. Virtually all of the literature on the enterprise reform examines the impact of 
reform on performance. Causality also operated strongly in the other direction. Poor or 
declining performance, particularly among enterprises operated at lower levels of 
government, motivates new rounds of reform. Indeed, the industrial innovation ladder 
predicts that causality should run from enterprise to reform (Jefferson & Singh, 1999). 
 We have information on various types of reform undertaken by enterprises by 
year. Given the strong heterogeneity across enterprises, regions, industries and time, we 
do not support a view of top-down initiated reform. Naughton (1995) supports our view 
when he states that the ex-post consistency of the reform process came about only 
because reforms were introduced in a heterogeneous/experimental fashion, where failures 
were disguised in the mass or by retrenchment. The information gathered in these initial, 
localised experiments were then reapplied to most SOEs in the mid-1980s, thus reducing the 
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cost of implementation due to trial and error (McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Qian, 1999). It 
was not then a grand vision and divine leadership that has produced seemingly successful 
reform in Chinese SOEs as one might be led to believe, but rather from pressure at the 
grassroots level.  
With respect to SOEs, prior to 1992 they were not privatised. Over the coming 
years there was a marked increase in levels of privatisation. Small SOEs were privatised 
at the county level and layoffs emerged at the city-level. This form of holding on to large 
enterprises was promoted by the slogan grasping the large and letting go of the small. 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises made up 95 percent of SOEs in 1993, and in many 
provinces about half of these were privatised by 1996. At this stage some ten million 
workers had been laid off from SOEs, and a further 11.5 million in 1997. This appears 
typical of Chinas initially slow pace of reform, which then accelerates. Large-scale 
layoffs were never a feature in modern China prior to this. In this paper we do not 
evaluate the benefit of privatisation after 1994. However, we do have the ability to 
estimate the impact of competitive pressure on productivity at the enterprise level under 
state ownership.  
3. THE BEHAVIOURAL MODEL 
 
As outlined above, our aim is to analyse changes in the distribution of 
productivity that is accompanied by enterprise-level institutional change, i.e. the initiation 
of deep reform. A necessary condition for this is the computation of consistent estimates 
of production function parameters. Our data indicate a great deal of heterogeneity in type 
and completeness of deep reform realised, even across industries and regions. We class 
the reforms that changed enterprise managers and workers incentives internally as initial 
or early reforms. Reforms that induced external competitive pressure (right to hire and 
fire labour, buy and sell capital assets and buy and sell into international markets) on the 
enterprise, that came later, we classify as deep reforms. We will allow productivity to be 
a major determinant of selection to deep reform. 
 Since the productivity variable is not measured directly in our data, the assertion 
that selection to deep reform and choice of factors of production should depend on 
productivity type leads to two complications when attempting to estimate a production 
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function. The first complication appears if productivity levels observed by managers 
determine input levels. Thus, we face the classic simultaneity problem analysed by 
Marshak and Andrews (1944). The second complication arises out of the fact that some 
enterprises select to reform while others do not. The evidence suggests selection to 
reform is related to productivity type. Hence we must deal with the fact that selection to 
deep reform implies a higher productivity type to begin with and may not be related to 
the reform per se. The problems associated with entry and exit of companies is widely 
discussed in western literatures. Here we have a balanced panel of enterprises, but 
unbalanced panels of reformed and unreformed enterprises, since not all firms engage in 
deep reform, and those that do, select at different points in time. If the decision to 
induce reform is related to their productivity level, then our unbalanced panels of 
reformed or unreformed enterprises result in part due to an endogenous selection process 
based on unobserved productivity. This would create selection bias in the production 
function estimates of our unbalanced samples of unreformed and reformed enterprises. 
 Olley & Pakes (1996) provide us with a dynamic behavioural model that allows 
for productivity differences within firms across time, and also across firms. This allows 
us to examine the effects of simultaneity and selection problems. In order to address 
simultaneity, the model specifies the information available when input decisions are 
made. The model develops a selection rule in order to tackle the selection problem. As 
in Ericson and Pakes (1995), it is assumed that current profits are a function of a firms 
state variables, factor prices, and the state variables of all other firms active in the market. 
We assume the vector of firm specific state variables consists of a firms age, ait, its 
capital stock, kit, and firm productivity, a measure denoted by ωit. A market structure 
consists of a list of these triples for all active firms. Factor prices are assumed to be 
common across firms and to evolve according to an exogenous first-order Markov 
process. 
 We will assume that each period a firm faces three decisions. First, the 
manager/government will decide whether or not a firm should embrace deep reform. If it 
does the manager faces a cost of doing this while reaping potential rewards. Given that 
decision, the firm will then choose its labour and investment level. We assume that labour 
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and investment levels can be freely chosen, the latter of which, together with firm-level 
depreciation, δt , determine next periods capital stock. 
 The accumulation equations for capital and age are given by 
 
(1)     kt+1 = (1  δt)kt + it and at+1  = at + 1, 
 
which hold with probability of one. Productivity, ω, is known to the firm and evolves 
according to an exogenous Markov process, as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). Its 
distribution at t + 1 conditional on all information known at t is determined by the family 
of distribution functions, 
 
(2)    Fω = {F( · |ω), ω ε Ω} 
 
Firms are assumed to maximise the expected discounted value of future cash flows. In 
this fashion a firms decision to reform, as well as its choice of investment, depends on its 
perception of the future market structure given available current information, which in 
turn affects the future market structure. Similar to Olley and Pakes (1996), we subsume 
the existence of a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium in investment strategies for our 
particular problem, which is similar to that defined and proved in Ericson and Pakes 
(1995). 
 In equilibrium, the profit and value functions depend on factor prices and the 
structure of the market. However, since we assume that these do not vary across 
competitors in any given period, we suppress them in our notation. Profit and value 
functions are thus indexed by time. In this way we take note of the fact that the 
relationship between a firms state variables and profit functions depends on factor prices 
and market structure. 
The Bellman equation for an incumbent firm can be written as 
 
(3) Vt (ωt, at, kt )=  
 Max {Φt(ωt , at, kt, rt= 0 ) , sup πt (ωt , at, kt, rt=1)  c(rt=1, it ) +   
βE[Vt+1 (ωt+1 , at+1 , kt+1, rt+1 = 1 )| Jt },   
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where πt ( · ) is the restricted profit function, which gives current profits as a function of 
the vector of state variables and reform status, c(it , rt) is the cost of current investment, it, 
and reform rt . β is the firms discount factor, and Jt represents information available at 
time t. Φt, the value of not reforming, naturally depends on the firms state variables. As 
noted in Olley and Pakes (1996), this lack of independence will have no effect on the sign 
of the biases so long as the difference between reformed and unreformed earnings is 
increasing in the state variables. 
 The max operator in (3) indicates that a firm compares the value of languishing 
with the expected return from selecting to reform. If the current state variables of the firm 
indicate reform is not worthwhile, it chooses investment and labour to maximise profits. 
Otherwise it reforms and chooses investment and labour appropriately. The solution to 
this control problem generates a reform rule, and an investment demand function. Let rt 
be zero for no reform choices, then the entry to reform rule and the investment 
demand equation can be written as 
 
(4) rt   = 1 if ωt  ≥ ωt(at, kt) 
= 0 otherwise 
 
(5) it = it(ωt , at ,rt, kt) 
 
Thus, a firm will choose to reform if its perceived productivity realisation is greater than 
the threshold productivity level, ωt, which depends on a firms age and capital stock at 
time t. The functions ωt ( · )and it ( · ) are determined as part of the Markov perfect Nash 
equilibrium, and will depend on all the parameters determining equilibrium behaviour.  
 
4. THE ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
 
Enterprises across different industries are assumed to produce homogeneous products 
with Cobb-Douglas technology. The log-linear production function to be estimated is 
given by 
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(6)    yit = β0 + βaait + βkkit + βllit + ωit + ηit 
 
Thus, we model the log of enterprise i's value added at time t, yit, as a function of the log 
of that enterprises state variables at t, namely age, ait, capital, kit, and the choice variable 
labour, lit. The error structure is comprised of a stochastic component, ηit, with zero 
expected value, and a component that represents unobserved productivity differences, ωit. 
Both ωit and ηit are unobserved, but ωit is a state variable, and thus affects firms choice 
variables. On the other hand ηit has zero expected value given current information, and 
hence does not affect decisions.  
 Simultaneity means OLS estimates should provide biased estimates for inputs if 
ωit is serially correlated, and the bias should be higher for more readily adjusted inputs. 
On the other hand, selection to the reform process has a negative bias on the capital 
coefficient. To see this, assume for the moment there are no variable inputs. The 
expectation of output at t conditional on current inputs, selection to reform, and 
information available at t-1 includes the term, Eit[ωit| ait, kit, ωit-1, rit = 1]. But, the 
necessary and sufficient condition for rit = 1 is that productivity is above some threshold 
level, ωit ≥ ωit(ait, kit). Also, we assumed the profit function is increasing in k, which 
implies the value function is also increasing in k. Thus the threshold productivity level, 
ωit(·), will be decreasing in k. Firms with a higher capital stock have higher profits, 
ceteris paribus, and hence can select to reform with lower realisations of ω. The entry to 
the reform process implies that Eit[ωit| ait, kit, ωit-1, rit = 1] is decreasing in k, producing a 
negative bias in the estimate of the capital coefficient. 
 The remainder of this section is an exposé of Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation 
algorithm, recast for our particular problem. The choice variables, labour and investment, 
are assumed to be the only variables that are affected by current productivity. Age and 
capital are fixed factors, and are only affected by the distribution of current productivity 
conditioned on the information available in the previous period, and past realisations of 
productivity. Specifically, the optimisation of (3) yielded the investment equation (5). If 
current investment is strictly increasing in current productivity levels, we can invert the 
investment equation iit = iit(ωit , ait, kit) for i1 > 0 and write, 
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(7)    ωit  = hit(iit, ait, kit). 
 
This makes the unobservable productivity variable a function of observable variables, 
which allows us to control for ωit in our estimation. The two assumptions here are a 
positive relationship between investment and productivity, and also the assumption that 
productivity is the only unobserved firm specific state variable. Substituting (7) into (6) 
gives; 
 
(8)    yit = βllit + φit(iit, kit, ait) + ηit 
 
where,  
 
(9)   φit(iit, kit, ait) = β0 + βa ait + βk kit + hit(iit, kit, ait). 
 
The partially linear equation (8) is a semi-parametric regression model, which defines the 
coefficient on labour while the parameters on the state variables are left unspecified. 
Thus, we are unable to distinguish the effect of capital and age on the investment decision 
from that on output. In order to identify βk and βa we will need estimates of the 
probability of selection to reform in addition to the estimates on βl and φit ( · ). 
 We look for the probability that a firm (we drop the i subscript) is reformed next 
period given the, currently known, threshold productivity next period and all information 
available at present. 
 
(10)     Pr{Χt+1 = 1 | ωt+1(at+1, kt+1), Jt} 
= Pr{ ωt+1 ≥ ωt+1(at+1, kt+1) | ωt+1(at+1, kt+1), ωt} 
= ρt(ωt+1(at+1, kt+1), ωt) 
= ρt(it, at, kt) 
≡ Pt  
Thus, the probability an enterprise will reform can be reduced to it, at, and kt 
because productivity can be calculated from these by (5), and threshold productivity is a 
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function of age and capital, which result from the realisation in the previous period of it, 
at, kt. The expectation of output at t+1 cleaned of the part attributable to labour at t+1 and 
conditional on selection to reform  
(11)  E[yt+1  βl lt+1 | at+1, kt+1, rt+1 = 1] 
= β0 + βa at+1 + βk kt+1 + E[ωt+1| ωt, rt+1 = 1] 
≡ βa at+1 + βk kt+1 + g(ωt+1, ωt) 
where,  
g(ωt+1, ωt) = β0 + ∫ωt+1 ωt+1 [F(dωt+1|ωt)/ ∫ωt+1 F(dωt+1|ωt)]. 
In order to measure the impact of the unobservable we need a measure of both 
productivity and the threshold level, i.e. the productivity value that sees a company as 
just indifferent between reforming and maintaining the status quo. 
 The selection equation (10) can be inverted provided F(dωt+1|ωt) > 0 about ωt+1, 
at every ωt, which allows us to express ωt+1 as a function of Pt  and ωt, which naturally 
extends to g(.). By conditioning on selection we can condition on the value of one of the 
indices needed. Then, for given βa and βk we can condition on the second index by 
conditioning on the semi-parametric equation in (8). 
 Substituting Pt and φt into g(.), and letting ξt+1 be the innovation in ωt+1 we have 
(12)  yit+1  βl lit+1 = βa at+1 + βk kt+1 + g(Pt, φt  βa at  βk kt)+ ξt+1+ ηt+1 
where, 
  ξt+1 = ωt+1  E[ωt+1| ωt, rt = 1] 
and from (9), (10), and (11), 
 
 g(ωt+1,ωt)  = g[ρt-1(Pt, φt  βaat - βkkt), φt  βaat - βkkt] 
   ≡ g(Pt, φt  βaat - βkkt) 
Since labour can adjust to shock productivity realisations this variable is not independent 
of ξt+1, which explains the need for the first stage estimation. The equations to be 
estimated are (8), (10), and (12). We get our estimate for labour and φt by running 
ordinary least squares with current value added as the dependent variable on the 
independent variables current labour and φt , which is a Nth-order polynomial with a full 
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set of interactions of the current variables age, capital, and investment. The probability of 
reform, Pt,  is modelled in (10), which states that this can be found by formulating a 
probability on the joint-outcome that productivity will exceed the threshold level, defined 
by the firms state variables, and last periods productivity realisation, estimated by using 
φt. This is essentially a probit regression of the reform-realisation on last periods 
investment, age, and capital realisations.  
The estimates for age and capital in (12) are obtained by minimising the squared 
errors in a non-linear search routine 
(13)  yit+1  βl lit+1 = βa ait+1 + βk k it+1 + ∑j=0
4-m ∑m4 βmj hitm Pitj + eit 
Where, Pit was estimated in (10) and hit(iit, kit, ait) = φit  β0 - βa ait - βk kit. We include 
time dummies in our regressions. The above should be re-written to allow for thirteen 
intercept shifts for each year. 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
In this section we will present our results. An important issue will be to determine 
whether reform is a state (exogenous) or an enterprise level choice variable. We shall 
begin by treating the reform status of an enterprise as exogenous (randomly assigned), i.e. 
as a state variable. In this context we will contrast the OLS and GLS within estimators 
with the Olley-Pakes estimator, which corrects for possible simultaneity bias. We find 
that the Olley-Pakes 2-step productivity estimate is significantly larger for the set of 
reformed versus the unreformed enterprises. This suggests that the reform status of an 
enterprise is endogenous to its productivity type. Hence, we progress by computing a 
predicted probability of being reformed in a probit model, and, using the Olley-Pakes 3-
step framework, find productivity estimates, which are corrected for simultaneity and our 
selection to reform bias. By splitting the sample according to reform status we implicitly 
we allow technology to vary across our sub-samples. We find consistently higher 
productivity estimates for our sample of deep reformers. The standard errors of the Olley-
Pakes coefficients are bootstrapped and clustered by 2-digit industries codes. 
 In Table 1 we document our descriptive statistics. Enterprises in the state of deep 
reform are bigger in terms of employment and capital. They produce more value added 
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and invest more in capital. Turning to our estimates of the parameters of the production 
function in Table 2 we note that the OLS and GLS estimates for the co-efficient on labour 
are consistently higher than the Olley-Pakes first-stage estimates. Also, the OLS and GLS 
estimates for the co-efficient on capital are significantly lower than the Olley-Pakes 
second stage estimates. We note that the coefficients on age and reform have a positive 
but lower impact on value-added in Olley-Pakes second stage estimates.  In addition, we 
do a standard parametric test to show that the additional regression variables that form the 
fifth order polynomial in hit are jointly significant. In Table 3 and 4 we report aggregate 
productivity measures for each year aggregating over reformed and unreformed 
enterprises using our 2-step Olley-Pakes consistent estimates, where productivity is 
measured as TFPit = exp( yit  βl lit - βa ait - βk k it ). Productivity in Table 4 is a weighted 
average of enterprise productivity, weighted by real value added. We clearly see that the 
reformed enterprises have larger productivity estimates, particularly in larger reformed 
enterprises. 
 This begs the question whether productivity may actually be endogenous to 
reform status. Thus, we progress by correcting for the likelihood of being selected to 
reform as a result of being a higher productivity type. We achieve this by first computing 
a predicted probability of being reformed in a probit model, where reform status is 
regressed on a polynomial of i, a, and k, and time dummies. Time dummies capture the 
gradual change in the environment of the enterprise, namely the increasing willingness of 
the centre to relinquish control over time. We then split the sample according to reform 
status. After estimating the labour coefficient for both sub-samples we progress by 
estimating coefficients for age and capital, equation (13), allowing non-parametrically for 
our theory of simultaneity and selection bias to back out, or control for, productivity. 
In Table 5 we find that the coefficient for labour is significantly higher for the 
unreformed sub-sample. There is a stark difference in the capital coefficients for the two 
unbalanced panels. Reformers thus appear to get a greater rate of return from capital vis-
à-vis the non-reformed sample. Interestingly, the age estimate for the reformed sample is 
higher for the unreformed vis-à-vis the reformed enterprises. Finally, we do a standard 
parametric test to show that the additional regression variables that form the third order 
polynomial in hit and Pit are jointly significant.   
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In Table 6 we address whether investment dynamics present in Chinese State 
Owned Enterprises are, at least ex-post estimation, correlated with enterprise level 
productivity. We see that investment and productivity estimates at the enterprise level are 
positively correlated over-time in both sub-samples. 
Table 7 and Table 8 again report unweighted and weighted average aggregate 
TFP estimates. It seems clear that productivity for the reformers, even after controlling 
for selection bias, is on average higher for the reformed enterprises vis-à-vis the 
unreformed enterprises, in terms of the adoption of deep reform. Thus, it appears that, 
while productivity influences the decision to undertake deep reform, productivity is also 
higher for the reformed enterprises. Finally, in Figures 2 and 3 we compare the estimates 
of productivity across reformed and non-reformed enterprises, respectively, by graphing 
the log distributions computed from using a simple OLS model, 2-step and 3-step Olley 
and Pakes procedure. The imposed distribution allows us to easily compare productivity 
distributions across graphs. While the 3-step Olley and Pakes procedure produces lower 
productivity estimates, on average, across reformers and non-reformers, the difference 
between the reformed and non-reformed population is much more pronounced. We 
believe that this highlights the importance of correcting for selection bias when one is 
evaluating the impact of reform on productivity dynamics. The adapted 3-step Olley and 
Pakes procedure allows us to do this with relative ease. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Using a unique balanced panel of 681 State-Owned Enterprises in the Industrial sector of 
China during the period 1980 to 1994 we estimate the effect of a set of deep reforms, the 
right to hire and fire labour, buy and sell capital and operate on international markets, on 
the productivity dynamics of enterprises. We find consistent production function 
estimates using an adapted algorithm put forward by Olley and Pakes (1996), which 
allows one to control for simultaneity and (our innovation) selection to reform biases 
with relative ease. We show that exposure to deep reform, competitive pressures, has 
induced higher productivity realisations under state ownership pre-privatisation.  
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APPENDIX I: THE DATA 
 
Data 
In what follows we will describe our data. We will proceed by first describing general 
features of the raw data and how we have used them to generate the actual dataset we use 
in our analysis. The data are compiled from SOE surveys conducted by the Institute of 
Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), in consultation with a dozen 
economists from Michigan and Oxford Universities, as well as from the University of 
California, San Diego. These surveys are unique in detail and quality. 
In total we have four individual sets of data, which can be subdivided into two 
different types of data. The first type is contained in two sets and contains quantitative 
information on individual enterprises, which is supplied annually by each enterprises 
accountant. These data have been recorded over two time periods. The first dataset ranges 
from 1980 to 1989, and the second ranges from 1990 to 1994. The earlier dataset contains 
769 enterprises, while the latter dataset contains a subset of the enterprises represented in 
the first, namely 681 enterprises.  
The second type of data is qualitative in nature, since it deals with the institutional 
environment of the firm, and also comprises two sets. The data represent the answers of 
each enterprises manager to a questionnaire in 1990 and 1995. Thus, the institutional 
questionnaires append the final year of the quantitative questionnaires, and hence they 
each contain information on exactly those enterprises that were present in the respective 
antecedent quantitative datasets. 
Since some the questions posed have not remained identical, it is important that 
we give a detailed account of how we constructed the variables in our dataset from these. 
We proceed by describing the features of the quantitative questionnaires first, followed 
by a description of the institutional ones. 
The 1980-1989 quantitative questionnaire contains 321 questions which are 
subdivided into twelve categories, labelled Output, Production Expenses, Wages, Labour 
and Personnel, Operations, Investment, Capital Accounts, Profit Accounts, Profit 
Retention and Enterprise Funds, Supplementary Materials, Costs of Main Products, and 
Other. 
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The 1990-1994 accounts questionnaire contains 166 questions, which are 
subdivided into eight categories, Output, Input, Wages, Financial Condition, Assets, 
Liability and Equity, Investment, and Utilisation of Capacity. 
The two institutional questionnaires are very similar. The 1990 one contains 
seventy questions in five categories, the 1995 one has eighty-four questions subdivided 
into six sections. Both have sections entitled Enterprise Characteristics, Contract and 
Management Appointment, Relations Between Enterprise and Its Supervisors, Internal 
Incentive Stem, and Management Characteristics. The 1995 questionnaire has an extra 
section with the title Property Rights and asset Structure, although many of the questions 
were already present in the 1990 questionnaire. Of these two we only need to make use of 
the 1995 questionnaire. 
The remainder of this appendix deals with the quantitative questionnaires, and 
with how we created the variables from these, which now form our data series from 1980 
through 1994. We will subdivide this section into various categories, depending on the 
type of variable we are dealing with. 
Table A1: Firm Characteristics 
 Dataset 
Variable 
Symbol 1980-1989 1990-1994 
Enterprise 
Identifier ID 
Unique Identifier for each firm {1 - 769} 
Location loc 
Three digit number, first indicates province and last 
the district 
Industry ind 
Number from 0  40, indicating the industry the firm 
belongs to 
Operation Year Op_y Year from which an enterprise commenced operation 
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Table A1 describes some of the unchanging firm characteristics. Each of the 681 firms 
has its own unique identifier in form of a firm identification number, ranging from 1 to 
769. An enterprises location is given by a three digit number, where the first number 
identifies the province a company resides in, and the last identifies the district in that 
province; the middle digit is a separator and is always zero. The industry affiliation of an 
enterprise is indicated by its industry code, which is a number between one and forty. The 
year of operation is given by a two-digit number, which indicates the year in the 
twentieth century that a firm commenced its operation.  
Table A2 is concerned with the creation of our Real Value Added Variable, which 
has been constructed from variables in the raw data and some deflators. We have 
enterprises value of output in present prices as well as in the prices of the base year for 
each dataset, namely 1980 and 1990. In order to get a consistent series spanning 1980-
1994 we decided to make use of the 1980-1989 real value of output series, and then 
applied a deflator, with 1980 as base year, to the present value of output 1990-1994 
series. The deflator supplied was by Changqi Wu. In addition, we have information on 
the value of raw materials consumed. By making use of the prices of the primary inputs 
and the quantities they were used in, we have constructed a firm-level material input 
deflator. Thus, we can create a variable that gives us the value of raw materials consumed 
at 1980 prices. When we subtract this real raw materials variable from real output value, 
we gain a variable that measures the value added for each enterprise in each year. 
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Table A2: Real Value Added 
Dataset 
   Variable 
Symbol 1980-1989 1990-1994 
Nominal Output Yn 
Current Price Value 
of Output in 10,000 
Yuan 
Total Value of Gross 
Output of Enterprise 
(present Value) in 10,000 
Yuan 
Base Year Output Yr 
Actual Value of 
Output (1980 Fixed 
Prices) in 10000 
Yuan 
Total Value of Gross 
Output of Enterprise 
(based on 1990 value) in 
10,000 Yuan 
Output Deflator ydef 
Nominal Divided by 
Real 
Output Deflator in 1980 
Prices (Li & Wu, 2002) 
Output yr = Yn/ydef 
Actual Value of 
Output (1980 Fixed 
Prices) in 10,000 
Yuan 
Nominal Output divided 
by 1980 prices Deflator in 
10,000 Yuan 
Materials mn 
Total Raw Material 
Consumption in 
10,000 Yuan 
Total Raw Material 
Consumption 10,000 
Yuan 
Material Deflator mdef 
Firm level raw material price index as calculated by 
Changqi, replaced by industry level deflator if 
missing. 1980 Base Year. 
Real 
Materials m= mn/mdef 
Materials Divided by the 1980 Prices Material 
Deflator 
Real Value Added y = yr - m Real Output minus Real Materials 
 
Table A3, the labour variable simply measures the number of employees the enterprise 
employed at year-end.  
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Table A3: Labour 
Dataset  
Variable 
Symbol 1980-1989 1990-1994 
Labour L 
Workers at Year 
End 
Total Number of 
Employees 
 
 
Table A4 contains information on how we created our Real Capital Stock and Real 
Investment variables. The 1980 level of the real capital stock is given by the net capital 
asset position of each enterprise. For every following year we create a new Real Capital 
Stock value, which is given by the previous years real capital stock, adjusted for firm 
level depreciation, to which we add Real Investment, which is investment in 1980 prices. 
Each of these constituent variables will be discussed in turn. Investment is deflated by a 
machinery output price index, with 1980 as base year, which yields Real Investment. 
Investment itself is given, where available, by productive fixed investment for the years 
1980-1989. Where it is not available, which includes the years following 1989, we use 
the year on year change in productive capital. Productive Capital, in turn, is given by the 
cumulative value, that is adding up receipts of purchases, of industrial production related 
fixed assets for all years. We get firm level depreciation rates by dividing depreciation by 
the capital stock. For the years 1980 to1989 depreciation is defined as the year on year 
change in cumulative depreciation. For the years 1990 to 1994 we use depreciation of 
fixed assets for the year. The Capital Stock is the cumulative value of fixed assets. 
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Table A4: Investment and Capital Stock Variables 
Dataset 
Variable 
Symbol 1980-1989 1990-1994 
Net Capital netk 
Net Value of Fixed 
Capital, end of 1980 
N/a 
Capital kn 
Fixed assets, at Purchase 
Price, year end 
Original Price of Fixed Assets 
Productive 
Capital 
kprodn 
Industrial Production 
Fixed Capital Part of 
Capital 
Original Price of Industrial 
Production Fixed Capital Part of 
Capital 
Depreciation deprn 
Net change in cumulative 
nominal depreciation, 
year on year in 10,000 
Yuan 
Depreciation of fixed assets of 
the year in 10,000 Yuan 
Machinery Price 
Index 
mpi Machinery Output price Index 
Real Capital kr = kn/mpi Capital divided by 1980 based machinery output price index 
Real 
Depreciation 
depr = deprn/mpi 
Depreciation divided by 1980 based machinery output price 
index 
Depreciation 
Rate 
δ = depr/kr Depreciation divided by Capital 
Investment in Productive Fixed Investment 
Real 
Investment 
i = in/mpi 
Investment deflated by 1980 based machinery output price 
index 
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1980 1981-1994 Real Capital 
Stock 
k 
k80 = netk80 kt+1 = kt(1-δt)+ it 
 
Table A5: Reform Variables 
                    Dataset 
Variable 
Symbol 1995 Questionaire 
Output 
Autonomy Output 
Year from which had autonomy over 
output, its value, and daily regular 
decisions 
Hiring and Firing Autonomy  Hire and Fire 
Year from which had autonomy over 
employing and dismissing workers 
Import and Export 
Autonomy 
Export 
Year from which had autonomy over 
exporting products and importing 
materials 
Short-run Investment 
Autonomy 
Investment_min2 
Year from which had autonomy over 
investment with a recovery period 
within two years 
Long-run Investment 
Autonomy 
Investment_max2 
Year from which had autonomy over 
investment with a recovery period 
above two years 
Autonomy over Buying and 
Selling Assets 
Buy and Sell Assets 
Year from which had autonomy over 
the purchase and sale of assets 
 
Table A5 displays the various reform variables we have for each company. They simply 
report the year from when on the enterprise manager gained the autonomy over specific 
decision processes. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for the Whole Sample and Split Sample 
 Whole Sample Non-Reformed Reformed 
Real Value Added 
 
Obs                9814 
Mean           2077.62 
Std. Dev.      6967.67 
Obs                6658 
Mean           1723.631 
Std. Dev.      5607.655 
Obs                3156 
Mean           2824.395 
Std. Dev.      9155.763 
Employees 
Obs               10055 
Mean           1793.95 
Std. Dev.      3346.93 
Obs                6859 
Mean           1766.152 
Std. Dev.      3460.653 
Obs                3196 
Mean           1853.605 
Std. Dev.      3088.451 
Real Value of Capital 
Obs               10094 
Mean           2376.19 
Std. Dev.      8561.92 
Obs                6891 
Mean           2092.949 
Std. Dev.      7698.843 
Obs                3203 
Mean            2985.59 
Std. Dev.      10148.11 
Age 
Obs               10215 
Mean           27.0294 
Std. Dev.      13.5560 
Obs                7012 
Mean           24.76997 
Std. Dev.      13.04616 
Obs                3203 
Mean           31.97596 
Std. Dev.      13.33683 
Reform Dummy  
Obs               10215 
Mean           .313558 
Std. Dev.      .463961 
  
Real Productive Investment 
Obs                9322 
Mean           397.995 
Std. Dev.      2911.12 
Obs                6656 
Mean           363.4397 
Std. Dev.      2763.446 
Obs                2666 
Mean            484.268 
Std. Dev.      3249.617 
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Table 2:  Alternative Estimates of Production Function Parameters 
Assuming Random Selection into an Exogenous State of Reform 
Estimation 
Procedure 
OLSa GLSb Two-Step Olley-Pakesc 
Labor .53 
(.02) 
.67 
(.04) 
0.51 
(.08) 
Constant -.67 
(.08) 
-.22 
(.24) 
.39 
(.23) 
Capital .40 
(.01) 
.20 
(.02) 
.48 
(.03) 
Age .20 
(.02) 
.16 
(.04) 
.08 
(.03) 
Reform Dummy .14 
(.03) 
.01 
(.02) 
.09 
(.03) 
Fifth Order Polynomial 
Expansion in h   
Yes 
χ2 (5) = 4,680 
Time Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,462 9,462 7,806 
R-sq 0.56 0.60 0.94 
Dependent Variable in a and b, the log of value added. Dependent Variable in c, the log of value added  
b1*log(labour). Standard Errors in brackets.  Olley-Pakes 2-step stand errors  bootstrapped with a  1000 
replications, clustered by industry. 
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Table 3: Average TFP from the 2-Step Procedure 
 Unreformed Reformed 
Year Mean TFP Mean TFP 
81 .74 1.38 
82 .74 1.40 
83 .91 1.08 
84 .90 0.91 
85 .97 1.54 
86 .99 1.57 
87 1.03 1.34 
88 1.22 1.30 
89 1.18 1.25 
90 1.13 1.34 
91 .99 1.27 
92 .92 1.33 
93 1.13 1.36 
94 .92 1.25 
 
Table 4: Output Weighted Mean TFP from the 2-Step Procedure 
 Unreformed Reformed 
Year TFP*(yi/Σy) TFP*(yi/Σy) 
81 .84 1.38 
82 .82 1.40 
83 1.05 1.13 
84 1.00 .95 
85 1.06 1.74 
86 1.08 1.83 
87 1.12 1.51 
88 1.35 1.41 
89 1.30 1.37 
90 1.24 1.49 
91 1.08 1.44 
92 1.02 1.49 
93 1.31 1.54 
94 1.04 1.41 
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Table 5: OP-Algorithm Estimates for Endogenous Reform Selection 
                Sample   
  Variable 
Reformed Sample Non-Reformed Sample 
Labor .46 
(.12) 
.54 
(.08) 
Constant -1.11 
(.46) 
-2.4 
(.60) 
Capital .46 
(.05) 
.23 
(.04) 
Age .45 
(.08) 
.98 
(.19) 
Third Order Polynomial 
Expansion in P & h 
Yes 
χ2 (15) = 1,783 
Yes 
χ2 (15) = 3,415 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 1,851 5,421 
R-sq 0.95 0.93 
Dependent Variable is the log of value added  b1*log(labour).  Olley-Pakes 3-step standard errors in 
brackets,  bootstrapped with a  1000 replications clustered by industry. 
 
Table 6: Correlations of Enterprise Level TFP with Choice and State Variables 
Reformed Sample 
|     TFP       Labor      age        k        I 
        TFP |   1.0000 
       Labor  |   0.0359   1.0000 
         age  |  -0.1543   0.1715   1.0000 
           k   |   0.0439   0.8031   0.1411   1.0000 
           I   |   0.1269   0.4975   0.1143   0.6013   1.0000 
 
Unreformed Sample 
           TFP     Labor      age        k        I 
         TFP  |   1.0000 
         Labor  |   0.0958   1.0000 
         age  |  -0.3967   0.2052   1.0000 
           k   |   0.1898   0.8242   0.1140   1.0000 
           I   |   0.2394   0.5907   0.0932   0.6543   1.0000
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Table 7: Average TFP, by year, from the 3-Step Procedure 
 Unreformed Reformed 
Year Mean TFP Mean TFP 
81 .23 - 
82 .24 .59 
83 .27 .65 
84 .31 .54 
85 .33 .84 
86 .32 1.66 
87 .32 1.02 
88 .38 .75 
89 .40 .67 
90 .36 .70 
91 .30 .70 
92 .27 .75 
93 .29 .75 
94 .28 .65 
 
Table 8: Output Weighted Mean TFP, by year, from the 3-Step Procedure 
 Unreformed Reformed 
Year TFP*(yi/Σy) TFP*(yi/Σy) 
81 .27 - 
82 .26 .59 
83 .31 .69 
84 .35 .57 
85 .37 .97 
86 .36 2.02 
87 .36 1.21 
88 .44 .82 
89 .46 .72 
90 .41 .78 
91 .34 .80 
92 .31 .86 
93 .34 .87 
94 .33 .74 
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Figure 2:  Reformed State Owned Enterprises  
Productivity Distributions from OLS, 2-Step & 3-Step procedures, respectively  
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Figure 3:  Non-Reformed State Owned Enterprises  
Productivity Distributions from OLS,  2-Step & 3-Step procedures, respectively.  
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